Now reading the rules for Arriba España and I realize that Mr. Train's designs depend on routines. This is why I was thinking about ASL while playing Algeria: I was referring to the rulebook each time the phase changed and then, often, looking to one of the many charts. Four playings in, some of this is becoming intuitive. Arriba's rulebook is organized similarly. Logical approach.
Is it possible to "normalize" such an approach where multiple routines become more intuitive? How can materials help? I think this is the main reason why CDGs have become so popular. Each card is effectively part of the rulebook dispersed to the time and place the rule is needed. Speeds play enormously. How to do both? How smooth can routines be made while remaining distinct?
I anticipate this will be a struggle, since I'm taking a more military science- and doctrine-based approach, and I might become burdened with more potential routines which risk having no significant game effect. Algeria does a nice job of avoiding this trap, actually.
Oh, by the way, even though this is solo play the score is FLN 4, FRA 0.
mercredi 23 juillet 2008
samedi 19 juillet 2008
Algeria, actual play
Actual play if you want to call soloing AP. The conceptual basis of this game is fantastic. It's right up my alley.
I get a weird ASL-ish feel sometimes, as the rules treat individual cases. Each type of mission works in a slightly different way, forcing me to resolve questions by paging through the rulebook. I guess what I'm saying is that it isn't intuitive. But what can you expect for a game that goes against the grain of a fifty-year gaming tradition which is the echo of stacks of western doctrine piled up on accounts of Eastern Front warfare in WWII and the Arab-Israeli wars?
It seems easy to come up with intuitive combat systems. Modeling intelligence operations is a damn sight more complex. How, for example, to model logistics' impact on intelligence collection? Much easier to figure out relative combat strengths. After all, the latter are written down in the manuals. Brain's game is illuminating because he understands that operations is not just a move-and-shoot affair.
I'm in my second solo play and it is going easier as I learn the routines. I still have the feeling that there are far too many charts. (Part of the problem is the way Firey Dragon chose to publish: there are no charts in the interior of the rulebook and each chart is published on a separate card, resulting in a hell of a lot of page turning and confusion).
While Brian's system seems scalable to smaller AOs than entire countries, I think the point of departure for our designs is different. The smallest unit in Algeria is a company. I'm thinking of a batallion-level simulation where the maneuver elements are platoons, squads, and teams.
I get a weird ASL-ish feel sometimes, as the rules treat individual cases. Each type of mission works in a slightly different way, forcing me to resolve questions by paging through the rulebook. I guess what I'm saying is that it isn't intuitive. But what can you expect for a game that goes against the grain of a fifty-year gaming tradition which is the echo of stacks of western doctrine piled up on accounts of Eastern Front warfare in WWII and the Arab-Israeli wars?
It seems easy to come up with intuitive combat systems. Modeling intelligence operations is a damn sight more complex. How, for example, to model logistics' impact on intelligence collection? Much easier to figure out relative combat strengths. After all, the latter are written down in the manuals. Brain's game is illuminating because he understands that operations is not just a move-and-shoot affair.
I'm in my second solo play and it is going easier as I learn the routines. I still have the feeling that there are far too many charts. (Part of the problem is the way Firey Dragon chose to publish: there are no charts in the interior of the rulebook and each chart is published on a separate card, resulting in a hell of a lot of page turning and confusion).
While Brian's system seems scalable to smaller AOs than entire countries, I think the point of departure for our designs is different. The smallest unit in Algeria is a company. I'm thinking of a batallion-level simulation where the maneuver elements are platoons, squads, and teams.
dimanche 22 juin 2008
Anxiety of Influence
Just received a copy of Brian Train's Algeria in the mail. Truly, I wasn't aware of any of his designs when I started working on MOOTWEFL. As it happens with any new literary endeavor (I think of games are essentially literary objects) the problem of strong precursors arise. We share many of the same prejudices about games and simulation and it is a bit disconcerting to see that mechanics that I thought I had invented (or at least stolen from sufficiently obscure sources) are already present in this nicely-published game. But then there is also Ici c'est La France. I guess I'm glad that I'm not designing an Algeria game!
Anyway. Brian and I (in my notes) have both taken a missions-based approach to the problem of representing COIN in a game. My idea is different in that the mission choices my players will take will come directly from the manuals I'm studying. It is evident that Brian has read the same manuals, of course, but players of Algeria aren't necessarily interested in learning English or NATO doctrine: my players will be. The problem with the greater amount of choice facing my players will be analysis paralysis. MOOTWEFL, as I have conceived it, will be played by groups of students with each group lead by a senior officer.
This is my story, anyway. For the moment, I'm sticking to it. There is the temptation to simply run my classes using Chris Engle's matrix games. It was actually Brian who suggested I do this. Doing MGs, in addition to preparing my classes, will oblige me to do the necessary research for any MOOTWEFL topics I want to treat later.
I've got to keep moving. In the description for Ici... I see certain design goals of mine nicely reflected. It still depends on point expenditure for actions, which is something I would like to do away with. The question is how can varying levels of legitimacy and logistics be gamed without resorting to point tracks?
Anyway. Brian and I (in my notes) have both taken a missions-based approach to the problem of representing COIN in a game. My idea is different in that the mission choices my players will take will come directly from the manuals I'm studying. It is evident that Brian has read the same manuals, of course, but players of Algeria aren't necessarily interested in learning English or NATO doctrine: my players will be. The problem with the greater amount of choice facing my players will be analysis paralysis. MOOTWEFL, as I have conceived it, will be played by groups of students with each group lead by a senior officer.
This is my story, anyway. For the moment, I'm sticking to it. There is the temptation to simply run my classes using Chris Engle's matrix games. It was actually Brian who suggested I do this. Doing MGs, in addition to preparing my classes, will oblige me to do the necessary research for any MOOTWEFL topics I want to treat later.
I've got to keep moving. In the description for Ici... I see certain design goals of mine nicely reflected. It still depends on point expenditure for actions, which is something I would like to do away with. The question is how can varying levels of legitimacy and logistics be gamed without resorting to point tracks?
jeudi 12 juin 2008
LOG probs
I really can't think of any wargame or war simulation that handles logistics in a suitable fashion. That is in a fashion where logistics doesn't take over the entire game. This probably just speaks to my ignorance but maybe not. Logistics officers in the real army are disliked by the operations mafia because they are the ones who say "we can't do that" after listening to complex, highly orchestrated operational planning briefings. Force-on-force simulations, such as those run in NATO joint exercises, are exceedingly labor intensive for G4. Look around the CP during such an exercise and the guys who never, ever look up from their work are almost always loggies. How to represent such toil "realistically" is risky for a game designers Most seem to choose to ignore LOG entirely or else relegate it to the event-card level.
The accounts I've read thus far for this AOI all emphasize the constant LOG struggle and the impact this had on the resistance's operational rhythm. Even platoon sized units all had someone specifically appointed to transport and logistics. I think it is a good principle to eliminate overarching similarities in favor of treating exceptions. So, rather than something like logistics points which is the seemingly neutral stance by many games which wish to introduce a LOG element, I'm going to try to come up with a system by which LOG is modeled on the number of things you can't do to reflect a little of the real-world desperation that can make life so difficult for G3.
Another aspect of these accounts was how important caching and LOG raids were. These were some of the most complex operations undertaken by the resistance in Auvergne. One 1944 raid on a gas depot in Puys-de-Dome involved personnel from three administrative departments, transport from two departments, LP/OPs, traffic control, signals, and caching in four widely separated locations. Imagine the attendant coordination and liaison difficulties this represents. So. I want caching to be represented in some on-board fashion as well. (I want everything to be represented on board). Also, beginning in 1942, the Allied S.O.E. began making LOG parachute drops as well. These were difficult to organize as the DZs could be compromised in so many different ways.
I want the Vichy/German player to be able to conduct sweep operations which discover caches as well as information operations which do the same thing.
The accounts I've read thus far for this AOI all emphasize the constant LOG struggle and the impact this had on the resistance's operational rhythm. Even platoon sized units all had someone specifically appointed to transport and logistics. I think it is a good principle to eliminate overarching similarities in favor of treating exceptions. So, rather than something like logistics points which is the seemingly neutral stance by many games which wish to introduce a LOG element, I'm going to try to come up with a system by which LOG is modeled on the number of things you can't do to reflect a little of the real-world desperation that can make life so difficult for G3.
Another aspect of these accounts was how important caching and LOG raids were. These were some of the most complex operations undertaken by the resistance in Auvergne. One 1944 raid on a gas depot in Puys-de-Dome involved personnel from three administrative departments, transport from two departments, LP/OPs, traffic control, signals, and caching in four widely separated locations. Imagine the attendant coordination and liaison difficulties this represents. So. I want caching to be represented in some on-board fashion as well. (I want everything to be represented on board). Also, beginning in 1942, the Allied S.O.E. began making LOG parachute drops as well. These were difficult to organize as the DZs could be compromised in so many different ways.
I want the Vichy/German player to be able to conduct sweep operations which discover caches as well as information operations which do the same thing.
mardi 10 juin 2008
It means MOOTW and English as a Foreign Language
I've started a consultancy to furnish English-language training to military personnel. I know what I'm selling (I've been selling it for three years) but now is the time to take my course outside of its comfy environs, especially as the units I teach to may soon be moving themselves.
So. It's clunky but it speaks exactly of what I do: Operational English, Unconventional Methods. Well, at least on my good teaching days. My students' deployment cycles seem to be increasing, so I'm called on to do lots of varied teaching to classes whose membership is never stable.
This blog is to be about my efforts to stay abreast of a rather demanding audience of learners. Over the next few months, I'll blog about my efforts to create a matrix game dealing with crowd control in Mitrovica in 2000. I'm excited about the potential MGs (matrix games) have for EFL, even though I'm a little wary of the conceptual barriers that this will present to my students.
It is out of this concern that I'm designing another game meant to serve as a platform for lessons on PKO, LIC, SASO, and OOTW. I want a platform that will allow me to teach area knowledge documents, U.S. doctrine, and current events that will be less linguistically demanding than an MG. Tall order, I know, but it should be fun to do. Before designing something about, for example, the EUFOR mission in Chad, the first draft will be about LIC in Vichy, France 1943-44. This won't help my course, but it should be a good shakedown of my initial ideas.
Part of undertaking such a large design project obliges me to be very honest about my own prejudices as a player. In my judgment wargames are complex for complexity's sake. A large number of gamers relish wiffling through pages and performing seemingly difficult calculations. It is a validating experience for them. I think doing so makes a game feel "real" to them somehow. These calculation-fests explain why they don't cotton to computer wargames, in spite of the considerable time savings in setup and conflict resolution represented by such games.
I cannot abide this for pedagogical reasons but I think American troubles in Iraq and the necessity for a reorientation of American doctrine owes to blind faith in quantitative models. Real war is decided in part on who has the more deeply subjective way of employing language. An example that, by now, everyone should be familiar with. The Vietnamese stood up to the United States's combat power using a tactic of "hanging on to the enemy's belt." It is possible this tactic might have been conceived in by using quantitative methods, but more likely it was the result of decades of asymmetric warfare. As a metaphor for TTP it is perfectly clear and easily transmittable. NVA field commanders understood the justice of the metaphor and led their troops accordingly.
I recently spoke with a French intelligence officer about using TacOps in my course. He listened with interest and looked at the maps I had drawn up, complete with the proper symbols for NGOs, HN forces, etc. "What you need," he told me, "is some kind of roleplaying simulation." He then went on to describe his abiding frustration with JANUS-based force-on-force joint exercises. "We do force-on-force conflicts because that's what JANUS does best," he said. I think the future of military game design will be much more language based. I only want to teach basic operational English. But perhaps the stakes are larger. Perhaps the winning side will be the one to come up with the clearest metaphor for the conflict.
Design goals for MOOTWEFL: AOI Vichy.
1. Diceless. Chasing dice around a classroom is a pain in the ass. As a long-time wargamer, I must say that I actually hate dice. Other peoples' are often filthy. They make too much freaking noise. No thought is possible while they are tumbling. For many reasons, I would like this game to be as language-based as possible, not the least of which is that the officers I've taught to seem to have a mistrust of numbers-based games--they're often fighting assymetric actions undreamed of by the philosophy of JANUS and which require more than knowing the difficult choreography of march speeds and effective ranges.
2. Vocabulary-bearing components. The game pieces (I envision cards) need to reinforce target vocabulary. The game should be an emitter of positive stress but, above all, an opportunity to employ recently learned vocabulary.
3. Speed. It should be possible to play one turn per course. My classes are often weekly but sometimes I run intensive ones. A game provides a structuring narrative for the entire course and should help with the attendance problem. Results will be posted at the class site, in hopes of getting students who miss to log in to check the game's progress and then, perhaps, to also download their homework.
4. Successful Operations will depend on successful speaking and writing. The conflict resolution mechanic I have in mind is stolen from the RPG FATE and involves invoking aspects to change outcomes. FATE stands for "fortune at the end" which means that dice are thrown and then modified before the outcome is decided. The usual order in a wargame is that modifiers are counted up and then dice are thrown and modified before the outcome can be known. I think FATE is ideal for narrative-rich RPGs because it requires that you rationalize reasons for invoking aspects in a linguistic fashion. This sort of thing goes on in classical wargames of course, usually after a wild roll. A pleasure of certain new-generation wargames like Combat Commander, is the world they evoke by provoking similar rationalizations
5. Clean. (No CRTs, no play aids, no secondary maps). No counting above "ten." Cross referencing and fiddling about with components is really time consuming. The minute you ask someone to figure an odds ratio on a play aid, they usually begin thinking in their native language. Everything necessary to play of the game should be on the board.
So. It's clunky but it speaks exactly of what I do: Operational English, Unconventional Methods. Well, at least on my good teaching days. My students' deployment cycles seem to be increasing, so I'm called on to do lots of varied teaching to classes whose membership is never stable.
This blog is to be about my efforts to stay abreast of a rather demanding audience of learners. Over the next few months, I'll blog about my efforts to create a matrix game dealing with crowd control in Mitrovica in 2000. I'm excited about the potential MGs (matrix games) have for EFL, even though I'm a little wary of the conceptual barriers that this will present to my students.
It is out of this concern that I'm designing another game meant to serve as a platform for lessons on PKO, LIC, SASO, and OOTW. I want a platform that will allow me to teach area knowledge documents, U.S. doctrine, and current events that will be less linguistically demanding than an MG. Tall order, I know, but it should be fun to do. Before designing something about, for example, the EUFOR mission in Chad, the first draft will be about LIC in Vichy, France 1943-44. This won't help my course, but it should be a good shakedown of my initial ideas.
Part of undertaking such a large design project obliges me to be very honest about my own prejudices as a player. In my judgment wargames are complex for complexity's sake. A large number of gamers relish wiffling through pages and performing seemingly difficult calculations. It is a validating experience for them. I think doing so makes a game feel "real" to them somehow. These calculation-fests explain why they don't cotton to computer wargames, in spite of the considerable time savings in setup and conflict resolution represented by such games.
I cannot abide this for pedagogical reasons but I think American troubles in Iraq and the necessity for a reorientation of American doctrine owes to blind faith in quantitative models. Real war is decided in part on who has the more deeply subjective way of employing language. An example that, by now, everyone should be familiar with. The Vietnamese stood up to the United States's combat power using a tactic of "hanging on to the enemy's belt." It is possible this tactic might have been conceived in by using quantitative methods, but more likely it was the result of decades of asymmetric warfare. As a metaphor for TTP it is perfectly clear and easily transmittable. NVA field commanders understood the justice of the metaphor and led their troops accordingly.
I recently spoke with a French intelligence officer about using TacOps in my course. He listened with interest and looked at the maps I had drawn up, complete with the proper symbols for NGOs, HN forces, etc. "What you need," he told me, "is some kind of roleplaying simulation." He then went on to describe his abiding frustration with JANUS-based force-on-force joint exercises. "We do force-on-force conflicts because that's what JANUS does best," he said. I think the future of military game design will be much more language based. I only want to teach basic operational English. But perhaps the stakes are larger. Perhaps the winning side will be the one to come up with the clearest metaphor for the conflict.
Design goals for MOOTWEFL: AOI Vichy.
1. Diceless. Chasing dice around a classroom is a pain in the ass. As a long-time wargamer, I must say that I actually hate dice. Other peoples' are often filthy. They make too much freaking noise. No thought is possible while they are tumbling. For many reasons, I would like this game to be as language-based as possible, not the least of which is that the officers I've taught to seem to have a mistrust of numbers-based games--they're often fighting assymetric actions undreamed of by the philosophy of JANUS and which require more than knowing the difficult choreography of march speeds and effective ranges.
2. Vocabulary-bearing components. The game pieces (I envision cards) need to reinforce target vocabulary. The game should be an emitter of positive stress but, above all, an opportunity to employ recently learned vocabulary.
3. Speed. It should be possible to play one turn per course. My classes are often weekly but sometimes I run intensive ones. A game provides a structuring narrative for the entire course and should help with the attendance problem. Results will be posted at the class site, in hopes of getting students who miss to log in to check the game's progress and then, perhaps, to also download their homework.
4. Successful Operations will depend on successful speaking and writing. The conflict resolution mechanic I have in mind is stolen from the RPG FATE and involves invoking aspects to change outcomes. FATE stands for "fortune at the end" which means that dice are thrown and then modified before the outcome is decided. The usual order in a wargame is that modifiers are counted up and then dice are thrown and modified before the outcome can be known. I think FATE is ideal for narrative-rich RPGs because it requires that you rationalize reasons for invoking aspects in a linguistic fashion. This sort of thing goes on in classical wargames of course, usually after a wild roll. A pleasure of certain new-generation wargames like Combat Commander, is the world they evoke by provoking similar rationalizations
5. Clean. (No CRTs, no play aids, no secondary maps). No counting above "ten." Cross referencing and fiddling about with components is really time consuming. The minute you ask someone to figure an odds ratio on a play aid, they usually begin thinking in their native language. Everything necessary to play of the game should be on the board.
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